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Resumo: 
O objetivo do trabalho é ilustrar uma abordagem semântico-pragmática para a 
leitura simboulética do modal ‘deve’. Para isto, é adotado o modelo de Kratzer 
(1981, 1991, 2012) para a análise de modalidade em linguagem natural, no 
qual um modal é relativo à informação contextual via base modal ordenada. 
A modalidade simboulética de Yanovich (2013a, 2013b), devido à sua natureza 
inerentemente performativa e mapeamento ainda incipiente, figura nessa 
ilustração. Diferentemente do modal russo ‘stoit’ investigado pelo autor, o modal 
‘deve’ do português brasileiro não é exclusivamente simboulético. Portanto, é 
necessário abordar aspectos de sua subespecificação que permitam uma leitura 
final simboulética - sendo mais fraca que uma diretiva e mais forte que uma 
asserção em termos de força performativa. Considerando diferentes contextos, 
o modal ‘deve’ parece ser simboulético quando enunciado com prosódia de 
aconselhamento, mas, quando dito como ordem, aparentemente entraria em 
colapso com diretivas, alterando a força performativa e derivando uma ORDEM 
em vez de CONSELHO. A fim de demonstrar como o contexto pode determinar 
a leitura final do modal, assume-se a perspectiva da Teoria da Relevância (Sperber 
e Wilson, 1986/1995), que busca explicar como se compreende o significado do 
falante e, neste caso, como se diferencia um conselho de uma ordem. A distinção 
entre significado conceitual e procedural, o procedimento de compreensão e a 
construção de conceitos ad hoc são explorados. Nesse aporte teórico, a prosódia 
codifica um significado procedural que restringe a leitura final, influenciando a 
força performativa do verbo modal e construindo um conceito ad hoc.
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Abstract: 
The aim of this work is to illustrate a semantic-pragmatic approach to the 
symbouletic reading of the modal ‘deve’. To do so, Kratzer’s (1981, 1991, 2012) 
framework of analysis for natural language modality is adopted, in which a modal 
is doubly relative to contextual information via an ordered modal base. Yanovich’s 
(2013a, 2013b) symbouletic modality, due to its inherently performative nature 
and, considering it is quite new, features in this analysis. Unlike the Russian 
modal ‘stoit’, the Brazilian Portuguese modal ‘deve’ (roughly, ‘must’ or sometimes 
‘should’) is not exclusively symbouletic. Thus it seems necessary to address the 
underspecification that allows a successful final symbouletic reading, ranking 
weaker than directives yet stronger than assertions in terms of its performative 
force. Considering different contexts of utterance, the same modal verb ‘deve’ 
seems to be symbouletic when uttered with a symbouletic prosody, but when 
uttered with a directive prosody, it appears to collapse, changing the performative 
force and yielding ORDER instead of ADVICE. In order to demonstrate how 
context may determine the final modal reading, we assume Sperber and Wilson’s 
(1986/1995, 2003) relevance theory, which aims to explain speaker’s meaning, 
differentiating order from advice. The conceptual-procedural distinction, the 
relevant-theoretic comprehension procedure and the constructions of ad hoc 
concepts are explored. In this framework, prosody encodes a procedural meaning 
which will constrain the proposition expressed, narrowing the performative 
force and rendering an ad hoc concept. 
Keywords: Modality; Semantics; Pragmatics.
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Introduction1
‘What are you doing next weekend?’ is a quite normal, mundane question we have all asked and in turn answered a few times in our lifetime. ‘Oh, I’m not sure, maybe I’ll sleep in if it gets very cold’, or ‘If you are free, we can 
do something together’ and ‘I have papers to grade’, are examples of answers 
deemed natural (thus possible) by any speaker. ‘I’ll fly to the moon’, ‘If it rains 
lava I’ll be the Queen of England’ are answers that would be, despite their 
structural soundness, puzzling, to say the least. To the dismay or the joy of 
linguists, however, the array of possible utterances in natural language does not 
divide itself in two neat groups instantiated by the examples mentioned before, 
“possible” or “puzzling”. What one deals with is a myriad of possibilities - after 
all, from a finite set of words we can create an infinite amount of sentences, 
some that we have never even heard before, thus displaying the creative and 
recursive aspects of the human language. On top of that, interaction does not 
make it any simpler.
Let us go back to an interaction everyone has, at one point or another, 
had with a vending machine. After standing in deep contemplation regarding 
1  We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this journal for their comments and 
suggestions, as well as the organizers and attendees of the XI Workshop on Formal Linguistics at 
the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR) for their contributions.
M. Monawar 
& C. Strey 
The Formal 
and the 
Relevant: modal 
underspecification 
and pragmatic 
disambiguation 
445
Revista Letras, 
Curitiba, ufpr, 
n. 96, pp. 441-460, 
jul./dez. 2017.
issn 2236-0999
(versão eletrônica)
the type of beverage or snack to get, a choice was made and, after inserting the 
appropriate amount of money, the numerical code corresponding to what one 
wanted was inserted. Thus, voilà, we get exactly what we asked for in that very 
unequivocal way. Alas, human interaction has never been and will never be so 
simplistic. In order to communicate with another about something that we wish 
or want them to do, there are no numerical, one-dimensional codes that cannot 
be misinterpreted or disputed. Quite the contrary, those who seek interactions 
so objectively may be often considered inadequate by most of their interlocutors. 
In this universe of infinite possibilities and interactional complexities, giving 
someone a suggestion, a piece of advice or an order is not as simple as our 
interaction with the vending machine. There are aspects related to linguistic 
structure and meaning in context that need to be accounted for, as well as non-
linguistic aspects that play their part during interaction, like gestures and facial 
expressions, for instance. 
To approach the practice of giving suggestions or advice and orders 
from all possible angles is an unsurmountable task. Here, we aim to reflect on a 
possible perspective, focusing on exploring a potential interface between formal 
and cognitive linguistics in terms of formal semantics and cognitive pragmatics. 
In order to at the same time illustrate and reflect on this possible interface for the 
study of the complexities involved in giving suggestions or advice and orders, 
we address Kratzer’s (1981, 1991, 2012) formal semantic approach to the analysis 
of modality in natural language and Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance 
theory to the explanation of how context influences meaning. 
This paper is organized in the following fashion: first, we illustrate the 
symbouletic reading of Brazilian Portuguese ‘deve’ (roughly, ‘must’ or sometimes 
‘should’) and its potential collapse between suggestion and order due to prosodic 
interference. Then, in order to expand the argument, the semantics of modality 
is discussed, following Kratzer’s (1981, 1991, 2012) framework and Yanovich’s 
(2013a, 2013b) proposal for symbouletic modality - concerning suggestion and 
advice. After that, the pragmatic aspects that come into play in the final reading 
of symbouletic modality are discussed under the scope of Sperber and Wilson’s 
(1986/1995) relevance theory. At last, final remarks about the illustration are 
made, considering next steps.
1.  Is that a suggestion or an order? 
The practices of giving advice, suggestions or orders, as mentioned 
before, can be encoded in a multitude of ways. These practices vary from one 
language to another, as well as how the target speech act is encoded in a given 
occasion. The difference between a piece of advice and an order in English 
may be, for instance, a lexical choice, when using ‘should’ instead of ‘must’. 
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Even so, it would be naive to discuss that as a generality disregarding contextual 
information altogether. 
Moreover, the same difference in terms of lexical choice may be said for 
Brazilian Portuguese (BP), in which the auxiliary modal ‘devia’2 seems to be 
lexically specified for conveying advice and suggestions (MONAWAR;PIRES 
DE OLIVEIRA, in prep.). On the other hand, another auxiliary modal, ‘deve’ 
does not seem to share the exact same semantic properties as ‘devia’, allowing other 
readings depending on the context. Furthermore, we argue here, depending on 
prosody as well. Thus, a given ‘Você deve x’ (‘You should/must x’) structure 
uttered within the same pragmatic constellation (concerning speaker, addressee, 
their relationship, context, etc.) may, depending on the prosody used, deliver 
a speech act of ADVICE or one of ORDER. Consequently, the aim here is 
reiterated, that is, the discussion of how prosody can, in the case of the BP modal 
‘deve’, alter the speech act delivered as an illustration3 of a possible interface of 
analysis for this modal within a semantic-pragmatic perspective.
Symbouletic modality, the modality of advice and suggestion, like 
any other modal flavor within Kratzer’s (1981, 1991, 2012) framework, relies 
on contextual information in order to come to its final reading. It requires a 
metaphysical modal base and a stereotypical ordering source, in which things 
go as they normally do in the potential worlds closest to the ideal. Inherently 
performative, this modal flavor, according to Yanovich (2013a, 2013b), has three 
core features: Decision, that is, the addressee is at liberty to choose p or ㄱp since 
none have yet been actualized; Advice Consistency, one cannot advise both 
p and ㄱp, and Performative Force, addressed in more detail in the following 
section. This last feature is the focus of attention in our discussion, in which 
we propose that the differentiation of symbouletics and directives (orders) can 
be signaled via prosody in Brazilian Portuguese symbouletic ‘deve’. Following 
Yanovich’s (2013b) proposal that symbouletics may come into collapse when the 
effective preference of the speaker is that the addressee does what is suggested, 
we propose that prosodic input4 provides pragmatic disambiguation between 
ADVICE and ORDER in examples like (1) and (2) below. 
Assume Laura and Tina meet for coffee and Laura starts complaining 
that she has been having terrible headaches for a week. Tina is worried about her 
friend, but she knows Laura always has headaches when she is stressed - which 
is true, since Laura has to deliver a major speech next week. Tina says to Laura, 
in an expected symbouletic prosody (1):
2  Considering the aim of this article, the imperfective in ‘devia’ is not going to be addressed 
here. Instead, ‘devia’ and ‘deve’ are going to be treated as two different modals.
3  The elaboration and discussion of this interface in all of its potential complexities is not 
within the scope of this work. The aim is to present a possible joint perspective of analysis for 
this particular phenomenon in Brazilian Portuguese. 
4  A phonetic description of these two types of prosodic input is not going to be developed 
here. Nevertheless, it seems accurate to describe symbouletic prosody as higher pitched than 
standard in the first, stressed syllable of ‘deve’; and directive prosody with an elongated vowel in 
the same syllable.  
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(1)  Você deve ir ao médico / You should see a doctor.  
 [with marked symbouletic prosody, thus ADVICE]
However, consider now a different background. Laura and Tina meet, 
but this time Laura no longer has to deliver a major speech, she is not stressed, 
but she has a serious sinus condition. Tina knows, however, that Laura hates 
taking medicine. At this point, Tina says (2), with directive prosody: 
(2)  Você deve ir ao médico / You must/have to see a doctor.  
 [with marked directive prosody, thus ORDER]
Example (2), however, creates an incongruence. Despite the fact that the 
prosody is marked as directive, the relationship between the speakers does not 
license an ORDER reading, but rather a symbouletic, ADVICE one. After the 
exchange, Laura could feel confused and would start looking for an implicature 
for the clash between what was said and how it was said: Does Tina think she 
can boss me around? Or is Tina really worried about my health? The list of 
possible interpretations may vary depending on the previous knowledge about 
each other, but dissonant inputs will render a incongruent meaning.
Another example illustrates the incongruence that arises when the expected 
speech act, given the context and the relationship between the interlocutors, is 
not the one that is ultimately delivered. Consider a situation in which, in order 
to start working at a company, John needs to undergo physical exams. Linda, 
in charge of Human Resources, contacts John to let him know that his exams 
have been scheduled for the following day. She utters (1) and proceeds with the 
details, rendering John quite confused - why would she be advising him to go, 
since she is in a position to be telling him to do so? Is this something optional? 
This confusion signals the contrast due to the use of symbouletic prosody by the 
speaker. The expected prosody in this case would be a neutral one, leaving the 
final reading to the propositional and contextual aspects of the utterance.
In order to contrast, consider the same situation, but this time Linda utters 
(2), ordering John to go take his exams the following day. Again John may be 
puzzled, seeking to derive an implicature as to why Linda would emphasize 
it as an order. Adding the fact that there is no possibility to reschedule John’s 
appointment, the directive prosody is then contextually coherent.  
These examples suggest that there are complexities involved in the 
way these contextual cues determine the final modal reading that need to be 
addressed. In order to explain how prosody interacts with context and how 
different interpretations are rendered it is important to assume a cognitive view 
of pragmatics5, in this case relevance theory (SPERBER; WILSON, 1986/1995). 
5  The decision to build an interface between formal semantics and cognitive pragmatics is 
due to the explanatory and descriptive force that arises from the approximation. Other interfaces 
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Aiming to explain how communication is processed, relevance theory is seen as 
a complex proposal to articulate pragmatic theoretical perspectives with recent 
studies in cognitive psychology. Sperber and Wilson (1995) therefore propose a 
model of ostensive-inferential communication, postulating two properties that 
cannot be dissociated: the communicator has to produce an ostensive act, and 
the audience has to make inferences about the communicator’s intentions. 
Overall, prosody in BP is an ostensive input that is worth reading, and it 
seems to communicate not conceptual meaning but rather procedural - which 
means that prosody guides how conceptual meaning is processed, it indicates the 
path a specific concept should be processed. Concerning the use of prosody in 
utterances with modal auxiliaries, symbouletic prosody specifies the modal force 
of symbouletic modality: it encodes a procedural constraint on the proposition 
expressed, narrowing the performative force and rendering an ad hoc concept 
on the explicature, which will only be determined in the context of utterance, 
as can be seen in (3):
(3)  Você DEVE ir ao médico. [You SHOULD/MUST see a doctor.]
The prosody in BP marks that there is an extra layer of activation that 
is worth processing because it is ostensive enough. The prosody - symbouletic 
or directive - indicates which meaning the concept DEVE carries: symbouletic 
meaning (advice) or directive meaning (order), aside from the standard meaning 
derived from propositional and contextual information with unmarked prosody. 
In this sense, incongruent uses of prosody and their clash with context, such 
as the situations discussed regarding (1) and (2) above, are explained inside the 
relevant-theoretic comprehension procedure and the conceptual/procedural 
distinction, yielding the reading as ADVICE or ORDER. 
However, before addressing how pragmatics aids in rendering the 
targeted modal reading in context, it is important to delve a bit more into the 
semantics of modals.
2. Symbouletic modality - the modality of advice
Going back to the very beginning, concerning our plans for next 
weekend, we will address the chosen object of discussion, that is, modality. 
When one goes about the different possibilities of plans for the weekend 
depending on the weather conditions, availability, feelings, etc., one modalizes. 
This type of displacement - that can co-occur with other types, like temporal 
or spatial, for instance - takes us from the reference world, normally the real, 
actual one, into other possible worlds, that represent “[...] many ways things 
may be built, but, for the time being, we have decided to bring together these two different 
sub-areas of Linguistics.
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could have been besides the way they actually are” (LEWIS, 1998, p. 96)6. 
Modality can thus be said to permeate reasoning regarding plans, conditions, 
wishes, knowledge, goals, and also suggestions, advice and orders, etc.. After 
all, when our mothers say “You should eat more vegetables”, ultimately they 
are not referring to the way things actually are, but to how things could (or 
even, should) be, other possible worlds in which we at least eat more vegetables 
than we do in the actual one. Comparisons such as this one can also be made 
between sets of possible worlds, when dealing with competing possibilities, for 
example: “You should have orange juice or ice tea, it’s too hot for coffee today”. 
Thus, through the semantic relations among linguistic expressions, we are 
sorting out the differences between the sets of possible worlds (KAUFMANN; 
CONDORAVDI; HARIZANOV, 2006) looking “into the way the human 
mind deals with inconsistencies” (KRATZER, 2012, p. 1).
2.1 Kratzer’s (1981, 1991, 2012) framework
Modality, as a natural language phenomenon, has been studied from 
several perspectives – be they formal, cognitive or social in nature. Formal 
approaches have taken much from ideas like the ones put forth by Aristotle 
– for instance, his discussion of cause and consequence, what may and what 
cannot be – into many different branches of research. The bridge between 
the quintessential modal logic approach to modality and its analysis in natural 
language has largely been built by Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012). 
Kratzer’s framework expands on Lewis’s (1968) quantificational approach 
to modals: they quantify over possible worlds. Relative to their context, modal 
meaning depends on two elements: a modal base, which is a consistent set of 
facts, and an ordering source, a set of ideals that derives graded modality. In that 
sense, in a certain context c in which the set of facts, or modal base, is related 
to speaker’s knowledge, one may say the modal base is epistemic. The worlds 
selected by this epistemic modal base will be organized by the ordering source, 
which is a set of ideals that may operate based on what normally takes place, on 
what is moral, etc. 
As modality permeates different types of reasoning, there are different 
types of modality, or modal flavors, i.e., different modal bases and ordering 
sources yield different readings, different modal flavors. (4) and (5) below are 
examples of the auxiliary modal ‘must’ in epistemic and deontic (related to laws, 
norms) readings:
(4)  John must be at work. 
 [epistemic - based on what the speaker knows about John’s routine]
6  Monawar (2016) discusses aspects to the analysis of modality in natural language that have 
been adapted or expanded from philosophical traditions.
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(5)  John must vote. 
[deontic - based on the laws John has to abide]
These two examples of ‘must’ consist of different readings of the same 
auxiliary modal, which have been achieved by contextual restriction of the scope 
of quantification it has over possible worlds. Von Fintel (2006, p. 4) summarizes:
Epistemic modality has an epistemic modal base and either no 
ordering or an ordering based on plausibility or stereotypicality. 
Deontic modality has a circumstantial modal base (because 
one may have to abstract away from one’s knowledge that the 
right thing will not be done) and an ordering source based 
on a body of law or principles. Bouletic modality again has a 
circumstantial modal base and an ordering source based on a 
relevant person’s desires. And so on.
This double relativity of modals (according to their modal base and 
ordering source) yields, contextually, the final modal reading in terms of its modal 
force as well. Concerning modal force, Kratzer (2012) affirms that, differently 
from the logical perspective in which necessity and possibility can be considered 
duals, there are instances or even languages in which this duality does not occur, 
resulting not in modals of necessity or possibility, but degree expressions of 
desirability or probability. In Brazilian Portuguese, according to Pessotto (2014), 
this takes place with the modal ‘dever’ (must/should), as it can be placed on a 
high end of a desirability/probability scale, while ‘poder’ (might/may/can) lies 
on a lower point of the same scale. Considering therefore an epistemic modal 
base and a stereotypical ordering source, different degrees of modal force are 
yielded depending on the modal used. For example, it seems rather unequivocal 
to judge “Deve chover amanhã” (“It must/should rain tomorrow”) stronger than 
“Pode chover amanhã” (“It might/may rain tomorrow”). This difference in force, 
one must remember, is ultimately provided by context via the modal base and 
the ordering source.
Finally, Kratzer’s double relativization of modals aims to account for 
modal underspecification – a hazy ‘must’ would only be so because its sentential 
context did not provide enough information for its relativization, what needs to 
be accomplished by other contextual cues sought by the interlocutors. As modals 
can be descriptive/static or performative (KAUFMANN, 2012), our concern 
here is to address performative modality, more specifically the modal flavor of 
suggestions and advice, and the contextual clues that relativize the modal and 
determine its final reading and their effects on the resulting performative force 
in terms of the speech acts of ADVICE or ORDER.
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2.2 Symbouletic Modality
Differently from other modal flavors that are static or some that may also 
be used performatively (deontic modality, for example), symbouletic modality 
is, in essence, performative. That means it does not have instantiations of non-
performative use, relying heavily on interaction. Coined ‘symbouletic’ by Paul 
Kiparsky and developed by Igor Yanovich (2013a, 2013b), this new modal flavor 
constitutes itself precisely on the hinges that make up the articulation of the 
interfaces, here being semantics and pragmatics.
Nevertheless, not unlike other modal flavors, symbouletic modality is 
doubly relative. According to Yanovich (2013a, p. 11), this modal flavor is relative 
to a metaphysical modal base and a stereotypical ordering source, so that:
y has control over p at an index i among stereotypically optimal 
worlds among the metaphysically accessible worlds at index i, 
there are p-worlds and ㄱp-worlds, and furthermore, there are 
actions available to y that bring about p, and similarly for ㄱp.
Thus, when one says “You should go to that concert”, the addressee is 
presupposed as having control over achieving p, in this case, going to the concert. 
The assertion present is that it is in some way beneficial for the addressee to go 
and, because of that, they should develop or have an effective preference7 (EP) 
towards p. The core of effective preference in contrast of simply having a preference 
is that action is involved. I can prefer waking up early than late, but if I have an 
effective preference for waking up early, I will make sure I am up and running 
whenever ‘early’ is. So, when I say “You should go to that concert”, I am at least 
hoping that the addressee will develop an effective preference towards going to 
the said concert perhaps because I deem it to be beneficial for them in some way. 
Summing up, Decision, that is, the addressee’s control over proceeding to p or 
even ㄱp if they choose, Performative Force, related to guiding the addressee’s 
actions via their effective preference, and Advice Consistency, meaning that 
one cannot advise both p and ㄱp,  are the core8 features of symbouletic modality. 
For the purposes of this work the feature of Performative Force is going to be 
addressed here.    
It has been said that symbouletic modality is inherently performative. 
That refers to the notion that it guides actions, patterning itself with imperatives 
(YANOVICH, 2013b). Yanovich (2013a, 2013b) describes the Russian modal 
7  The notion of effective preference (EP) is not addressed here due to the scope of the discussion. 
See Yanovich (2013a) for details concerning EP and symbouletic modality and Condoravdi and 
Lauer (2011, 2012) for its proposal.
8  Addressee benefit is not considered by Yanovich (2013a) a core feature of symbouletic 
modality because English ‘should’ and Russian ‘nužno’ can be used for suggestions that do not 
involve addressee benefit, like in “You should be quiet now”. For a thorough approach to other 
features of symbouletic modality the reader is referred to Yanovich (2013a, 2013b).
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auxiliary ‘stoit’ that, unlike English ‘should’, is exclusively symbouletic, and 
proposes its formal analysis as below (YANOVICH, 2013b, p. 22):
(i)  stoit(x,p)
 presupposes decision(x,p)
 asserts best (x,p) Λ advise(SU,x,p), where SU (from SUggest-er) is the         
 subject in a matrix context, and the attitude bearer under attitudes 
Considering the formal analysis of ‘stoit’, the author proposes the 
formalization of ‘advise’, including EP (YANOVICH, 2013b, p. 24):
(ii)  advise(SU,x,p)
 EP(SU, Λq best(x,q)) -> EP(SU,EP(x,p))
The formalization above can be paraphrased the following way: “If 
your interests were the most important thing for me, I would have tried my 
best to get you do p” (YANOVICH, 2013b, p. 25). This follows Condoravdi 
and Lauer’s (2011) formalizations of EP in other performative situations, like 
commissives and directives. What would, then, be the relationship between 
symbouletic modality and these other EP-based meanings? Yanovich (2013b, 
p. 27) claims that symbouletics are weaker than directives, and may give rise 
to scalar inferences - if one used a symbouletic, then a directive would have 
been too strong, even though the author acknowledges situations where they 
may collapse, such as when the speaker has an EP about what the addressee 
does. Then, technically, symbouletics are stronger than simply asserting what 
would be good for y to do, and at the same time weaker than a directive - the 
author argues that they are conditional directives (YANOVICH, 2013a). This 
clean-cut scale cannot always be thus addressed, and the analysis of symbouletics 
grows more and more complex when the modal under analysis is not exclusive 
to this type of reading, as is the case of the non-dual Brazilian Portuguese (BP) 
modal auxiliary ‘deve’ (it can roughly be translated into ‘must’ or even ‘should’, 
a matter discussed in Strey and Monawar (in press)). 
As mentioned before, following Kratzer (2012), not all modals have duals, 
that is, some can be degree expressions that belong to the upper end of a scale. 
According to Pessotto (2014), that is the case for BP ‘dever’, a modal auxiliary 
that can have different readings, as in the examples below:
(6)  Você deve votar / You must vote. 
 [deontic - according to the law]
(7)  Você deve ser a Ana / You must be Ana. 
 [epistemic - based on knowledge and evidence]
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(8)  Você deve pegar o trem amarelo / You should take the yellow train.   
 [teleological - considering goals]
(9)  Você deve ir ao médico / You should see a doctor 
 [symbouletic - guiding the addressee’s actions for their benefit]
Other readings of ‘deve’ are possible, but they are not our focus here. 
The aim of the examples above is to illustrate different instantiations of ‘deve’ in 
different readings due to different contextual information that has restricted the 
modal via its modal base and ordering source. In (6), the modal scopes over a set 
of worlds that is metaphysical, those in which the addressee goes to the doctor, 
and orders them as things normally happen, according to the ideal that the 
addressee will comply and have the EP to go see a doctor. So far so good, right? 
In interaction, however, a few issues arise. 
We have elsewhere discussed that BP prosody can perform alterations in 
the final reading of the modal in terms of its modal force (MONAWAR;STREY, 
2014). When it comes to the symbouletic reading of this modal, prosody can 
alter the final modal reading and, consequently, its performative force, causing 
the collapse between symbouletics and directives discussed before. It is due to 
this possibility that the analysis of ‘deve’ in BP symbouletic modality may give 
way to a better understanding of how contextual cues contribute to the final 
modal reading and the delivered speech act. With that in mind, the following 
section deals with the pragmatics that comes into play.
3. The pragmatics of prosody
The shades of communication have been the main object of pragmatics, 
whose definition itself is too vague and too general. Defined as the study of 
language in communication, its boundaries are blurred, as it can be related and 
influenced by different disciplines. Broadly speaking, the study of propositional 
or linguistic meaning is the domain of semantics, and the study of utterance or 
speaker meaning is the domain of pragmatics. Assuming that speaker meaning 
involves cognitive machinery, pragmatics has its roots in the cognitive sciences 
and explains how cognitive processes are involved in intentional verbal and 
nonverbal communication (HUANG, 2012). That said, relevance theory comes 
up as an alternative to take one step further in the description and explanation 
of human communication. 
3.1 Relevance theory framework
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance theory is concerned with the 
establishment of a cognitive principle to explain the inferential process of human 
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communication. To understand what has been ostensively produced, the hearer 
has to recover the linguistically encoded sentence meaning, which is contextually 
enriched to yield the speaker’s meaning. There are different processes that take 
place at this time, such as resolution of ambiguity and referential ambivalences, 
interpretation of ellipses, identification of implicatures, resolution of illocutionary 
indeterminacies, interpretation of metaphors and ironies, and underdeterminacy 
of explicit content that may be present (WILSON; SPERBER, 2004). Finally, 
according to relevance theory, the resolution of a fully fledged speaker’s meaning 
requires a set of contextual assumptions. 
In order to explain how the audience understands the speaker, Wilson and 
Sperber (2004, p. 259) suggest that the hearer follows a procedure to perform 
those subtasks and builds a hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning:
(i)  Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure: 
(a)  Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test 
interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, 
etc.) in order of accessibility; 
(b)  Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
The theory foresees that the inferential process happens on both explicit 
and implicit levels, treating the identification of explicit context as inferential 
as the implicit one. Relevance theory bets on the existence of an intermediate 
level between what is said and what is implied: the explicature – which is a 
communicated proposition recovered by a combination of decoding and 
inference, and that works as a premise to derive contextual implications and other 
cognitive effects (SPERBER; WILSON, 1986/1995). The explicature involves 
a basic level – the enrichment of the logical form – and a higher-level, which 
requires more pragmatic development such as determining the propositional 
attitude or embedding the basic proposition into a speech act. Various pragmatic 
operations take place in the explicature, such as the determination of the final 
reading of a modal and the resulting performative force. 
On this account, the construction of both explicature and implicature 
is a result of a process of mutual parallel adjustment, and the hypothesis 
about speaker’s meaning is considered in order of accessibility. During the 
comprehension process, some words present in the explicature are adjusted 
according to the context in which they occur, and they are derived as ad 
hoc concepts (CARSTON, 2002). According to Wilson and Carston (2006), 
each time a concept is communicated, it is automatically adjusted through an 
online process to form the explicature. Once adjusted, through restrictions or 
extensions, the ad hoc concept is created and the inferential process continues 
through the construction of implicatures9. 
9  It is important to note that the construction of both explicatures and implicatures are 
made online and in parallel. The sub-tasks of interpretation are not sequentially ordered, but 
developed against a background of hypotheses that may be re-elaborated as the communication 
unfolds (WILSON; SPERBER, 2004).
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On the presumption that the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance, 
they will test in context the most accessible meaning to see whether it achieves 
sufficient cognitive effects. If, when processed in context, this interpretation 
provides enough cognitive effects for the effort invested, the hearer would take 
it to be the one the speaker intended; if not, they look again. According to 
Wilson (2012), the existence of ad hoc concepts may allow the treatment of 
more abstract cases. For example, scalar terms such as tall and short may be seen 
as encoding the same conceptual information (localization on a height scale), 
but different procedural orientation: tall indicates that one moved up the height 
scale, and short that one moved down the height scale.
       
3.2 Conceptual and procedural meaning
Assuming a relevance-driven theory of pragmatics (SPERBER; 
WILSON, 1995, 2012), Blakemore (1987, 2002) stated a difference between 
content words (e.g. ‘cat’) and procedural words (e.g. ‘therefore’). The first are 
seen to encode concepts that contribute to the truth-conditions of a sentence, 
such as ‘dog’, while the latter carry a non-truth conditional meaning, guiding 
the inferential comprehension process, e.g. ‘therefore’. The procedural idea is 
inherently pragmatic, as Bezuidenhout (2004, p.1) posits: 
Something that lies on the procedural side of the procedural/
declarative divide is something inherently pragmatic that 
belongs to a performance system, and is distinct from the 
knowledge that is constitutive of a speaker-hearer’s semantic 
competence.
 According to Wilson (2012), procedural expressions correspond to states 
of language users. In this sense, a procedural expression may activate or trigger 
procedures already available to the hearer, being hard to pin down in conceptual 
terms and appearing in different types and forms. Procedural meaning is not 
only found in specific classes of words such as conjunctions; it is also present in 
other nonverbal inputs such as prosody. Wilson (2012) proposes we find clusters 
of procedural items (interjections, attitudinal particles, intonation) linked to 
emotion reading (WHARTON; STREY, in press) and to mindreading (BARON-
COHEN, 1995). The author also says procedural meaning can be found in 
different parts of discourse, such as punctuation, prosody, and discourse particles, 
guiding the comprehension process in one direction or another. Observe the 
effect of prosody on the interpretation of  “Sue has money”. If the word ‘money’ 
is stressed, it may guide the inferential process to imply that Sue not only has 
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money but she has a lot of money. Wharton (2009) describes prosodic inputs as 
highly context-dependent, because they interact with information from other 
sources, and they may have different effects depending on the occasion. The 
author (WHARTON, 2009, p. 141) posits that a general point of agreement in 
the literature is that
prosody typically creates impressions, conveys information 
about emotions or attitudes, or alters the salience of 
linguistically possible interpretations rather than expressing 
full propositions or concepts in its own right. 
Procedural meaning, hence, constrains the search for relevance, 
narrowing the range of hypotheses and constraining both the explicature and 
the implicatures derived. House (2006) says that prosody can be best described 
as forming the packaging rather than the content of a message. It has multiple 
functions: directly encoding the type of cognitive effect intended; constraining 
the context, orienting the hearer to access a particular set of assumptions, setting 
procedural constraints on explicit content. 
When a marked prosody is inserted in a neutral utterance, it is interpreted 
as a relevant input, which is worth processing in a context of available assumptions 
to yield positive cognitive effects. It will encode procedures to constrain what is 
being conceptually communicated. Consider example (10), where Mary meets 
her son Jack, who is feeling cramps after running a half marathon. Mary says to 
Jack, stressing the word ‘deve’ with directive prosody.
(10)  Mary: Você DEVE comer mais banana. (You MUST eat more banana).
 Following a path of least effort in looking for enough cognitive effects, 
“the more salient the prosodic input, the more it will be expected to contribute 
to the speaker’s meaning by achieving positive cognitive effects” (WILSON; 
WHARTON, 2005, p. 442). In example (10), when produced with directive 
prosody, it would increase the hearer’s phonological processing effort, but at the 
same time it would encourage them to look for extra effects. The concept DEVE 
therefore would be adjusted during the recovery of the explicature, rendering 
the concept DEVE* with directive meaning. (11) is a schematic outline of how 
Jack might use the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure to construct a 
hypothesis about the explicature of Mary’s utterance:
(11) 
 (a) Mary said to Jack, ‘Vocêx DEVE*/DEVE** comer mais banana.’ 
         [Vocêx = Jack] 
         [DEVE* = advice reading]
          [DEVE** = order reading]
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(b)  Mary’s utterance will be optimally relevant to Jack.
(c)  Mary’s utterance will achieve relevance by explaining that bananas are  
 good for cramps.
(d)  Mary’s directive prosody indicates that the utterance is an order.
(d)  Explicature: Jack DEVE** (HAVE/MUST) eat more bananas. 
 In (11), the hearer assumes that the encoded word meaning and the marked 
prosody are clues to the speaker’s meaning. Guided by expectations of relevance 
and using the available contextual assumptions, Jack starts deriving cognitive 
effects. When there are enough effects to satisfy his expectations of relevance, 
he stops. The result is that the explicature (11d) contain not the encoded concept 
DEVE but the ad hoc concept DEVE**, with a different denotation. If (11) was 
uttered with a neutral prosody, it would not be processed as a relevant input; 
therefore it would not activate an extra layer of cognitive effort.   
To account for meaning in context implies bringing into the game 
different aspects of communication. The vending machine situation is an 
example of the code model of communication: a message is first coded then 
decoded. I want water, so I press the right buttons - encoding the message; the 
machine will give me water - decoding what I communicate. There is not a 
lot of space for anything that falls out of the given rules of the game. However, 
this is not always the case when we communicate: sometimes an order seems 
like an advice, and vice-versa. And it depends on different cues, like prosody - 
as has been here shown. In order to explain how we mean more than what we 
say, it seems necessary to have a model that explains how we produce different 
inferences depending on the given context. 
 
4. Final remarks
The aim of this work was to illustrate a possible semantic-pragmatic 
approach to symbouletic modality in terms of the contributions of prosodic 
input in ADVICE and ORDER speech acts derived from utterances with the BP 
modal ‘deve’. To do so, we have discussed Kratzer’s (1981, 1991, 2012) framework 
of analysis for natural language modality, in which a modal is doubly relative 
to contextual information via a modal base and an ordering source. In addition, 
Yanovich’s (2013a, 2013b) symbouletic modality was chosen its inherently 
performative nature and, considering it is quite new, still widely uncharted 
territory. 
The Brazilian Portuguese auxiliary modal ‘deve’, unlike the Russian ‘stoit’, 
does not seem to be exclusively symbouletic, thus its underspecification must be 
dealt with in order to discuss when one obtains a successful final symbouletic 
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reading, ranking weaker than directives yet stronger than assertions in terms of 
its performative force. This modal, when uttered with marked directive prosody, 
appears to collapse with directives, changing the performative force and yielding 
ORDER instead of ADVICE. On the other hand, it seems to yield ADVICE 
when uttered with marked symbouletic prosody. We have discussed that this is 
perhaps a way of signaling the speaker’s effective preferences in relation to what 
is being said and what they want the addressee to do. In order to address how 
these contextual cues act in the pragmatic disambiguation, we have worked 
from the perspective of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) relevance theory and 
its articulations of conceptual and procedural meaning in the arriving of the 
explicature and implicatures.
Further theoretical and experimental research is needed in order to fully 
elaborate and commit to the proposal sketched here, especially in terms of 
testing native speakers’ reactions to incongruent settings of contexts and marked 
prosody like the ones mentioned regarding examples (1) and (2). Nevertheless, 
this work has accomplished its aim, to illustrate the possible interface and 
discuss the contributions of both semantics and pragmatics to the analysis of this 
phenomenon in natural language.
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